(Originally posted by Pat on 10/12/09)
At
least, that's what he seems to be claiming, since he is a professed
Christian, a professional apologist with a doctorate in apologetics, and
the author of a book and star of a TV show each called I don't have enough faith to be an atheist.
The image this gives me is of some sort of cartel of dogmatic atheists,
hell-bent upon the destruction of truth and moral values. Either that,
or an incredible degree of ignorance not only among the world's general
population (of which the majority are of course neither Christian nor
atheist nor anything in particular), but specifically among the
intellectual elite, since 95% of the National Academy of Sciences and
Royal Academy of Sciences are atheist or agnostic. In Turek's view,
apparently elite scientists are ignorant and/or dogmatic, and only
preachers and apologists understand the truth. If only those scientists
were wiser or less dogmatic, they would see that it's obvious that a
first-century Roman mystic created the world and then millennia later
was born of a virgin and rose from the dead to sacrifice himself to
himself for the sins of all humanity, and he loves us so much that he
offers us eternal bliss, but if we reject his offer he will punish us
with eternal torment.
I'm
writing because last Thursday Campus Crusade for Christ sponsored Turek
in delivering a lecture at Angell Hall. (I would have posted sooner,
but first I lost my login info and then I came down with H1N1 influenza.
It's too bad that we can't really transcend our chemical and
biological bodies; I'd much prefer to do so at the moment.) I along with
several other members of the Umich chapter of the Secular Student
Alliance attended this lecture and challenged Turek in the ending
question-answer period. (The lecture was at 20:00, so the timing was
perfect; our regular SSA meeting time at 19:00 allowed us to plan an
hour in advance.) Let me give credit where it is due: Turek was a
wonderful speaker, extremely well-prepared, persuasive in his style,
quick-thinking on his responses, a commanding presence in the room. He
does everything right in terms of style and delivery. I'm told he
destroyed Chris Hitchens in debate, and I'm sure he could spar on even
terms with Sam Harris or Richard Dawkins. If he chose, he could probably
run for President and gain a substantial following as a Republican
front-runner.
On
the other hand, his arguments are facile and fallacious, and despite
speaking for about ten minutes in the question-answer period, I wish I'd
been given more of an opportunity to dissect the myriad ways in which
his claims were false and his inferences were illogical. Fortunately, I
have a fairly good memory and took good notes, and I will now go through
my notes and memories and reconstruct what I wanted to say.
I should admit that I interrupted the lecture on one occasion. It
seemed a little rude, even to me, but the statement Turek had just made
was simply false, on a basic level of factual knowledge everyone should
have. He said "The second law of thermodynamics: Everything is running
out of energy, until there will be no energy left." Basically, he fails physics 101. Energy is conserved, and this is a basic principle of physics that applies in every domain. In fact, energy is locally conserved,
meaning that loss of energy in one point in space is always accompanied
by a proportional energy current connecting that point to other points
where a gain of energy takes place—the strongest possible sense in which
a quantity can be conserved without being uniformly constant (and by
the way, that's the first
law of thermodynamics). This is if anything evidence that in order for
God to make the universe, he had to send out energy pulses corresponding
to the amount of matter in each location to every location in the
universe—and presumably would lose energy in the process and could not
make the pulses travel faster than the speed of light. (But God is
magical, so science doesn't apply to him, right?) Entropy is the subject of the second law of thermodynamics, and it increases over
time in a statistical fashion in closed systems. After interrupting I
finally got Turek to admit his mistake and replace it with "Everything
is running out of order over
time", which still isn't strictly true but isn't an insult to the
intelligence of anyone who has ever studied basic physics. But in order
to make the error, Turek either needed to have no understanding of
science whatsoever, or be intentionally misleading; either way this
damages his credibility severely, and I felt obligated to point it out.
We arrived early and sat near the front in our "Evolution is only a
Theory" ("Just like gravity!") tee shirts; several of the Cru people
recognized me from previous events and welcomed me back, which is at
once quite flattering and a little unsettling. They know who I am.
Anyway, all the Christians in the audience—there were many—were very
congenial, and we actually received applause for our attendance on
behalf of the secular community. This too was a little unsettling; they
think we're going to suffer eternal punishment and damn well deserve it,
but they welcome us with open arms and wide smiles. Perhaps this is
similar to the sort of congeniality a doctor gives to an Alzheimer's
patient; their world is so distorted and their life so lacking in
meaning, one cannot help but feel pity and sympathy for them. Yet I
would never suppose that an Alzheimer's patient deserves their
suffering, so the analogy can't be quite right.
Turek began the lecture with a discussion of truth, and several logical
arguments in defense of absolute truth, if not of the possibility of
actually knowing said
absolute truth. This portion was basically sound, and would generally
be in agreement with the views of any mainstream philosopher. The one
exception was when he attributed to Dawkins the claim that "Only science
can produce truth", and then argued that this is not itself a
scientific statement, and hence is self-contradictory. As far as I can
tell, Dawkins never uttered these words exactly, but if he did say
something like this, it's clear to me from Dawkins' positions on various
issues that he must have meant by "science" something like "reason and
evidence", since Dawkins has never attacked the disciplines of history,
philosophy, or mathematics, and indeed has great respect for them. In
that sense, then "only science can produce truth" is in fact sound, and
is indeed itself a "scientific" statement—since it is based on reason
and evidence. Maybe this was sloppy on Dawkins' part—or maybe it was a
willful distortion by Turek—but it certainly does not undermine the
point that reason and evidence is the only way to obtain truth. Indeed,
this latter notion seems to be one that Turek agrees with, at least in
lip service, since none of his arguments were based upon emotion or
faith, only on claims about facts and logic. In any case, we all agree
that truth exists, and that postmodernist attempts to undermine absolute
truth are absurd and self-defeating.
Next
Turek propounded three arguments for the existence of God, two of which
he called "scientific" and the other he acknowledged as philosophical:
The cosmological argument, the teleological argument, and the moral
argument. These he espoused as knock-down arguments that render atheism
logically untenable.
Of
course, they are nothing of the sort. The cosmological argument is
questionably sound, since it presumes that all events have
causes—including the origin of the universe itself, a fortiori the origin of time. Normally it seems reasonable to presume that events have causes, but to presume that time itself has
a cause is at best problematic—Turek made much of a distinction between
"ontologically prior" and "chronologically prior", but it is not clear
to me that this means anything, since every other case of ontological
priority is also a case of chronological priority, and the causal
structure of the universe depends upon this. At the very least I can say
that there is something very odd about the origin of the universe, and
perhaps it is legitimate to talk of a "cause" of that origin—but there
is no reason whatsoever to think that this "cause" is anything like a
personal benevolent being, much less the immaterial incarnation of a
first-century Roman mystic.
The
teleological argument is clearly unsound; in fact, I'm not even sure
it's logically self-consistent. Paley's original argument hinges upon
the difference between beaches of sand and clockwork watches, and then
turns around to assert that because we can see design in the watch, we
see the same design in nature, and so the universe—and hence the
beach—must have an even greater designer. I think I agree that we can
see design in the watch, though I'm cautious about this, since part of
how I know about the design in the watch is that I know what a watch is
for and what sort of people make them and how; it's not clear
to me that an ammonia-based lifeform from the Andromeda Galaxy would be
able to discern that a watch was designed by an intelligent being. But
even Paley must admit that we do not see design in the sand on
the beach, which undermines his entire claim that design is evident in
the structure of the universe itself.
Furthermore,
almost immediately after Paley invented his argument from design, David
Hume undermined it, showing that the inference from complexity to a
designer would require an infinite regress of ever-more-complex
designers. The Christian response is to say that the buck stops at God,
but Hume rightly realized that there is no coherent way to say so, since
in order for God to be the designer of everything he must be an actual
infinite, the termination of an infinite regress—a construct that almost
everyone agrees cannot exist.
This
left the world in the awkward position of saying that design doesn't
really make sense and chance doesn't really make sense, so we need
another option—but no one could think of another option. This was how
things stayed until Lamarck, and then Wallace, and above all, Darwin realized
that complex life could arise gradually by a process of random change
combined with natural law. Darwin managed to construct an empirically
verifiable and mathematically sound scientific theory of the development
of life by gradual processes, which has since been expanded with
advances in genetics and verified by multiple lines of evidence in
geology, chemistry, biology, and psychology. The teleological argument
received its seminal and total refutation upon the publication of the
first edition of the Origin of Species—today its coffin is not
only nailed, but buried and beginning to rot. Anyone who would resurrect
the same facile argument a century and a half later is either
incredibly ignorant or willfully dishonest—given Turek's education, I
vote the latter.
The
crux of Turek's argument for the Cross, however, clearly lies in the
moral argument. The cosmological argument vaguely suggests that something maybe
caused everything, and the teleological argument makes us feel like
perhaps there was a designer involved; but only through the moral
argument can you actually argue that God is a personal and benevolent
being deserving of our worship.
So,
here is the moral argument as presented by Turek: People vary in their
level of moral goodness (Turek puts Hitler at the bottom and Mother
Teresa at the top. I mostly agree with the former but not the latter,
but this is beside the point). Without God, we have no absolute measure
for this moral goodness, and so we have no basis for saying that any
person or action is moral or immoral—hence, atheism is tantamount to
nihilism. Turek made the analogy to measuring length: Without a standard
ruler, we cannot say that anything is longer than anything else.
We
spent a great deal of time debating about the length analogy, which was
mostly my fault—I should have attacked the moral argument directly. As I
pointed out, we've been able to agree that some things are longer than
others for thousands of years without having a standard ruler, and only
recently have scientists actually devised a formal system for defining
length measurements under the SI. Officially the definition of "meter"
was changed in 1983 to the distance that light travels in exactly
9,192,631,770/299,792,458 times the period of the radiation
corresponding to the hyperfine transition in the caesium-133 atom at
rest at absolute zero in zero gravity. Needless to say, shoe sizes and
building codes were unaffected.
But
as I should have realized sooner at the time, this is only tangentially
relevant to issues of morality. A much better argument againxt the
moral argument for God is the Euthyphro dilemma: Is good good because
God likes it, or does God like it because it is good? If the former,
good is arbitrary and God is a Supreme Fascist; if the latter, morality
exists prior to God and does not need God.
Turek
was obviously familiar with this argument, and repeatedly stated an
argument that "God is the standard, God is good by definition"; we
questioned this from several angles, and rather than addressing our
objections Turek simply repeated the same statements over and over
again. Finally, I got fed up and asked, "How is that not word salad?"
Turek gave no answer, but moved on as if he had.
I
pointed out that Turek, like most of us, considered Hitler's genocide
to be terrible and monstrous, among the worst behaviors any human being
has ever done. I then pointed out that genocides very similar to
Hitler's were condoned in the Bible and even commanded or performed by
God himself. His answer was pathetic, and I think even the Christians in
the audience realized this: He said basically that the Canaanites and
Amalekites and Sodomites were so terribly evil that they deserved what
they got. In fact, he criticized atheists for asking why God doesn't
solve evil and then complaining when he does—as if the only conceivable
way to stop evil actions was to devastate the entire civilization in
which the perpetrator resides. On this reasoning we would punish a
convicted murderer by detonating a nuclear warhead upon the city in
which he resides. Moreover, it is not at all clear that these
civilizations were actually immoral; our only evidence from this comes
from the people who killed them, and they have no chance to offer a
rebuttal. But even if it's true that people were performing terrible
evils in these nations, I shouldn't have to explain why the solution was
not utter devastation and the systematic slaughter of thousands of
people.
Turek
then asked me, "What is the ultimate standard of morality?" I gave the
only answer I could, given the time constraints: "It's complicated." He
asked again, saying "It's a simple question"; I answered, "No, it's not a
simple question! It's one of the fundamental questions of human
existence!" I stand by this statement, but I don't think it was
persuasive to the audience, and I don't think I articulated my stance
very well. Essentially what I was trying to say was this: Deep truths
are complex; they are nuanced; they are difficult to discover and
understand. Anyone who thinks they have a simple answer is delusional,
for there cannot be a simple answer. A question like "What is the
ultimate standard of morality?" cannot be answered in a single syllable!
"God"—without further explanation of what God is, how he exists, and
how he serves to answer the questions of morality—is no better an answer
than "me" or "nothing" or any other answer. In the exchange I mentioned
utilitarianism as one proposal; I'm not actually a utilitarian, and I
admitted as much; but Turek didn't seem to understand what was intended
by utilitarianism, and seemed to shoehorn in arguments he had previously
prepared against hedonism and some sort of vague consequentialism. In
the former case he asked why Hitler's pleasure doesn't justify his
genocide; the utilitarian answer is trivial, namely that the pain of so
many others outweighs this pleasure. In the latter case he asked what
"the greatest good for the greatest number" means, and when I explained
"the sum of pleasure minus pain" he didn't seem to understand, and went
back to hedonism. Essentially I get the impression that Turek has never
read a single work of ethical philosophy that was not written by
Christian apologists, and therefore has very poor understanding of
utilitarianism, Kantianism, and every other mainstream ethical
philosophy.
Turek
also challenged materialism, saying, "Was Hitler just a chemical
imbalance?" I answered, as any good neuroscientist would, with
"Arguably, yes." There is a deep sense in which all that we are is
defined by chemical interactions, and Hitler was no different. A sound
account of morality must explain how beings made of chemicals can be
moral or immoral; it cannot deny that we are made of chemicals, for
plainly we are.
Those
were the arguments that, however incompletely, I got the chance to
make; there were others I did not have the chance to make, at least not
with the audience listening. The most important was the fact that the
entire event was orchestrated around three false dichotomies: Christian
versus atheist, Divine Command versus hedonism, God versus chance.
Obviously,
Christian and atheist are not the only options; there are an infinite
range of possible beliefs systems, many thousands of which are actually
believed by thousands of people, and a few of which are believed by
millions. In the false dichotomy, arguments against atheism can seem
like arguments for Christianity; but when you realize that the dichotomy
is ridiculous, you find yourself wondering how a moral argument for God
can distinguish Christianity from Pastafarianism, much less from Islam
or Hinduism. (And of course even the arguments against atheism are
singularly weak.)
Basically
the entire field of ethical philosophy is dedicated to developing moral
systems that are neither Divine Command nor hedonism, since both of
these have been completely discredited by centuries of compelling
arguments. There is no clear consensus on the foundations of ethics, but
there is a clear consensus on the fact that morality doesn't require
God and that raw selfishness is not the answer. Some philosophers might
say that God can influence morality—but not fundamentally ground it;
others would say that an enlightened and tempered self-interest is a
sound moral system—but this is hardly unfettered hedonism.
Finally, the "God versus chance" dichotomy was precisely what
Darwin's theory of natural selection was devised to escape. The whole
point of evolution is that it explains how a combination of chance and
law can produce results that are supremely well adapted, without
recourse either to magical beings or extremely improbable coincidences.
It requires deep time to do this, millions, even billions of years;
fortunately for science, geologists have gathered plenty of evidence
that the Earth is plenty old enough to allow this.
The
next major point I didn't get the chance to make was that Turek kept
saying that DNA is a message, akin to "Take out the garbage – Mom" or
"In the beginning God created the heavens and the Earth". He spoke a
great deal about how improbable it would be for such messages to arise
by chance, which is of course correct.
But DNA is not a message! DNA is scarcely even similar to a message! A better analogy would be to a program—DNA is a sequence that actually does things,
not a sequence that needs to be written and read by some intelligent
being. It's also an active chemical, and obeys chemical laws just like
any other. It is the things that DNA does that natural
selection acts upon; no one needs to read the message, and hence there
is no improbability associated with the presence of a message.
Furthermore,
Turek advanced his argument against evolution based upon the complexity
of an amoeba. To the uneducated, the amoeba seems like a simple life
form, the sort of squishy primordial goo from which life must have
emerged. Turek correctly noted that the amoeba is an extremely complex
system, with many interacting components and massive amounts of genetic
data.
But
whether he failed to realize this or simply failed to acknowledge it,
no biologist would ever say that the amoeba was the first form of life!
Nor would any assent to the notion that the amoeba is even similar to the first form of life. The amoeba is an advanced creature,
a eukaryote like us; it arose about 1 billion years ago, while the
first life arose at least 3 billion, possibly 4 billion, years ago. For
at least 2/3 of the time life has existed, nothing so complex as an
amoeba has existed.
A
far fairer comparison would be to archaea, which are basically lipid
bubbles with DNA and a few proteins in them, or viruses, which are
literally protein packets full of short strands of DNA. Even then, it
would be necessary to acknowledge that all the archaea and viruses which
exist today are the result of billions of years of evolution, and that
the first living organism is long-since extinct and far simpler than
these.
Most
of his arguments were for theism generally, but Turek also defended
Christianity in particular. His evidence basically focused upon the
historical accuracy of the Bible, combined with emphasis of the pain and
suffering that Christian martyrs were willing to undergo in defense of
their beliefs.
This would be hilarious if millions of people didn't actually seem to find it convincing. Martyrdom is evidence of sincerity, not accuracy; and people have sincerely believed
all sorts of ridiculous things for all of history, and many people
continue to do so today. So some Christians were eyewitnesses who
martyred themselves; do the names "Heaven's Gate" or "Branch Davidians"
ring a bell? So the Bible is fairly consistent with known history and
archaeology and full of accurate details; so are the Iliad and Harry
Potter, but that doesn't mean that Athena is real or that magic is
possible. Turek tried to defuse the argument that Muslim martyrs prove
Islam, because naturally he realized this would undermine his entire
position; but the fact that Muslims will martyr themselves centuries
later is in fact evidence against the idea that the sincerity of ancient
Christians proves Christ's divinity—if even people centuries later can
be sincere enough to die for their beliefs, then surely eyewitnesses
duped by a charlatan can! People are duped by charlatans all the time;
think Jose deLuis deJesus, L. Ron Hubbard, Uri Geller. I don't know
whether Jesus was a liar or a lunatic, or some combination thereof; but
given the number of liars and lunatics that people believe with utmost
sincerity, it is simply ridiculous to think that he was Lord. Only
someone completely ignorant, or trained only in defending Christianity,
could think such arguments plausible; anyone with a thorough
understanding of the history and psychology of religion—much less the
methodology of science—rightly finds this kind of argument absurd.
I'm
glad we showed up; it increased our visibility and attracted a few new
people to our group. But it was definitely frustrating to debate such
inanity. And of course I doubt we changed many minds last night, least
of all Frank Turek.
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